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This article outlines a theoretical framework for researching popular politics in the 
Middle East and North Africa. The paper sketches a Gramscian alternative to existing 
approaches in materialist Marxism, cultural studies, and social movement studies. It 
aims to think a Gramsci useful to historians, political scientists, sociologists and 
anthropologists, beyond the common loci of Gramsci scholarship in political theory, 
comparative literature, and international relations. With a start point in Gramsci’s 
philosophy of praxis, it puts forward a concept of popular politics as a mostly slow-
moving, complex and many-layered transformative activity, a form of historical 
protagonism comprised of a variety of moments, capable of working changes on 
existing forms of hegemony and founding new social relations. The point is to enable 
researchers in Middle East Studies to see and research popular politics, carry on a 
critique of transformative activity, and to inform transformation in the present.   
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This article outlines a theoretical framework for researching popular politics in the 
Middle East and North Africa, drawing on Gramscian perspectives. While the problematics of 
popular politics, the question, as the young Gramsci put it, of ‘how best to convert the facts of 
vassalage into the signals of rebellion and social reconstruction’,1 have traditionally been 
occluded in Middle East Studies, the post-2011 context, overall, has been more fertile and 
provocative. The paper sketches a Gramscian alternative to existing approaches in materialist 
Marxism, cultural studies, and social movement studies. It aims, further, to think a Gramsci 
useful to historians, political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists, beyond the common 
loci of Gramsci scholarship in political theory, comparative literature, and international 
relations.2 With a start point in Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis, it puts forward a concept of 
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popular politics as a mostly slow-moving, complex and many-layered transformative activity, 
a form of historical protagonism comprised of a variety of moments, capable of working 
changes on existing forms of hegemony and founding new social relations. The point is to 
enable researchers in Middle East Studies to see and research popular politics, carry on a 
critique of transformative activity, and to inform transformation in the present.   
Popular Politics Occluded and Engaged 
 
Middle East Studies has not engaged as extensively with questions of popular politics 
and subaltern activism as might be assumed. (Neo)Orientalism dismisses popular politics in 
racist, exceptionalist and essentialist terms as ‘self-pity’, ‘Muslim rage’, terrorism, resentment, 
sexual frustration, violence, disorder and threat.3 Essentializing and romanticizing the subaltern 
in the clothes of cultural and religious authenticity has been shown to be problematic in 
nationalist and Islamist perspectives.4 Elitist and hard-power approaches are still common, 
especially in conventional political science.5 Narratives of globalization tend towards 
determinism and homogenization, and liberal discussions of civil society, human rights, and 
the public sphere towards a focus on abstracted, middle class, respectable, professionalized, 
legal, decorous, ‘civilized’, and non-subaltern practices.6 Social movement studies tends not to 
see or think hegemony and subalternity, and fails to engage with challenges to domination, 
changing the world, or critical studies of capitalism, state power, race, gender and sexuality.7  
Critical work also has problems. Materialist Marxism, rising again since the financial 
crisis of 2008, often suffers from ‘mechanistic and fatalistic conceptions of economism’.8 
Thinking subaltern activism solely in terms of class struggle and capitalism diminishes the vital 
 
3 Burke and Lapidus, Islam, Politics, and Social Movements; Said, Orientalism. 
4 Achcar, Marxism, Orientalism, Cosmopolitanism; Al-‘Azm, “Orientalism in Reverse”; Fahmy All the Pasha’s 
Men; Mossallam, “‘Hekāyāt Sha’b.’”  
5 Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, The Arab Spring; Owen, State, Power and Politics. 
6 Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders. 
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importance of body, civil society, culture, and politics. Studies of hegemony, even in 
Gramscian mode, often emphasize political economy over culture, and/or start from the top 
down, seeing resistance as an epiphenomenon of dominant tendencies.9 Although important 
research has been carried out,10 Subaltern Studies has had less traction in Middle East Studies 
than in South Asia and Latin America, and has been appropriated less in terms of popular 
struggle and politics ‘from below’, and more in terms of power/knowledge and discourse.11 
Foucauldian approaches around discipline, power/knowledge, the microphysics of power, 
Orientalism, and gender/sexuality are usually taken up in ways that leave the issue of 
substantive transformative activity in the shadows.12 Or, the critique of Western discourse can 
drown out the interpretive and historicizing understanding of the struggles and lives of 
subaltern groups.13 In cultural studies, the problematic of signification tends to displace 
questions of practice, subaltern experience, organization, and strategy. 
The popular uprisings of 2011, the Rojava Revolution, and the rapid growth of the BDS 
movement inter alia, have accompanied some positive changes. The uprisings of 2011 enrolled 
a new generation in activism, and stimulated the study of non-elite initiatives. Critical and 
engaged fora such as jadaliyya.com have emerged. Tunisia has hosted the World Social Forum 
twice. Dissatisfaction with uncritical social movement studies has been registered.14 There have 
been powerful critiques of global civil society, NGOs, international donors, human rights 
discourses and international law.15 Middle East Studies has attracted more interest among 
progressives generally.16 There has been important new work on feminism, gender, sexuality 
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and transnationalism,17 as well as on resistance, protest and popular politics, including in 
Gramscian perspective.18 Right-wing, populist, misogynist and authoritarian tendencies in 
countries such as Turkey, Israel and Egypt have sharpened the urgency of questions about 
popular politics. Gramsci’s inter-war Italy, and the rise of fascism in the wake of the biennio 
rosso of 1918-20, looks more relevant to the contemporary MENA. While ‘morbid symptoms’ 
abound,19 promising directions in activism and research fertilize the development of new 
approaches. 
The Philosophy of Praxis 
 
The framework begins with Gramsci’s ‘philosophy of praxis’. The major premise is 
that the ‘philosophy of praxis’ is not materialist Marxism. It is instead an original synthesis of 
Benedetto Croce on culture, Niccolò Machiavelli on the state, and Karl Marx on capitalism – 
elaborated in Italy in the age of Vladimir Lenin. Out of this synthesis comes Gramsci’s core 
concept of hegemony – the complex, incomplete combination of theory and practice, coercion 
and consent at work in the realization of activity in a concrete ‘historico-political’20 formation. 
Gramsci’s synthesis involves unity in diversity, history and theory, base and superstructure, 
and an interlocking of culture, economy, civil society, and the state. Parsing hegemony 
involved Gramsci in an original elaboration of concepts of civil society, organic intellectuals, 
historical bloc, dominant and subaltern social groups, wars of manoeuvre and position, and his 
great emphasis on ‘cultural direction’, contradictory consciousness, conceptions of the world, 
forms of collective will, organization, leadership, and the national-popular. It is sometimes 
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forgotten that hegemony as a living historical activity does not sanctify the status quo, but puts 
it in a critical, historical light, referencing its incompleteness, for those seeking to transform it 
via revolutionary praxis and the construction of alternatives. The latter involves ‘practical-
critical activity’,21 a new unification of theory and practice; it implies a ‘going to the people’, 
where the latter is understood as the ensemble of subordinated groups. Praxis embraces and 
actualizes what the young Marx called the ‘categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in 
which man [and woman] is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being’.22 Praxis involves 
historically-embedded conscious, collective activity challenging subordination and building 
new social relations, changing the terms of existing form of hegemony and/by ameliorating or 
eliminating subaltern status. Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis is powerful start point for the 
study of popular politics as transformative activity. 
Thinking power, subordination and transformation in terms of hegemony and praxis 
has a vital importance in Middle East Studies. First, in combining culture, economy, civil 
society, and the state, this approach responds to Lockman’s unresolved challenge to the field: 
‘to combine due attention to the question of representation with due attention to social and 
political dynamics, hierarchies of power and historical contexts, and to explore how these 
domains are intertwined’.23 Lockman sought a way beyond the linguistic and deconstructionist 
excesses of the cultural turn. He sought an approach that could sustain an analysis of material 
practice, without a return to economistic or deterministic Marxism and/or modernist teleology. 
Second, Gramscian perspectives have a particular ability to travel because of their rich attention 
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to history and national context. Gramsci’s core concepts, indeed, only make sense when 
thoroughly historicized.24 
Subaltern Social Groups 
 
Gramscian optics imply that the study of popular politics engages, first, with the 
historical and interpretive understanding of the experiences and situations of subaltern social 
groups, including workers, peasants, migrants, women, slaves and minorities,25 ‘serial’ sets of 
social subjects, thrown together or dispersed, having in common not a ‘fused’ or conscious 
community, but a similarity of fate, and living a situation marked and defined above all by 
subordination amid a complex and incomplete ensemble of hegemonic structures.26 
Subordination operates directly and indirectly through cultural speechlessness, embodied 
social stigma, economic dispossession, and political exclusion. At stake are both objectification 
and subjectivation: subaltern social groups are defamed, Otherized, misrecognized, and made 
inarticulate; they are subjectivized by reading and understanding their own situation in terms 
of a common sense marked by the concepts of ruling and middle classes elaborated and diffused 
in civil society; they are economically exploited, reified, marginalized, and made dependent, 
and they are subjected to violent domination. Their very being is riveted to nature: to the 
primordial, the racialized epidermis, the ethnic, the improvident, the base, the hysterical, the 
sexually deviant, the exotic, the irrational, and the violent. The subaltern woman, by the 
standards of the Italian public, writes Gramsci, is enclosed in a ‘circuit of nerves, muscles and 
sensitive skin’; she is ‘the female who nurses her newborn and feels . . . a love made up of 
spasms of the flesh and palpitations of the heart’; or she is the cocotte, a ‘slave’ in the 
‘bourgeois family’, ‘the doll who is the more dear the more stupid she is’.27 She, in Sartre’s 
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phrase, ‘subordinates her reality as a conscious subject to the Other that she is for Others’.28 
The words and actions of subaltern groups are explained as but the ‘expression of a 
psychophysiological mechanism’.29 Like Jews in Arendt’s Europe or gay men in Eribon’s 
France, they are by turns ‘pariah’ or ‘parvenu’, absent qua group ‘from the historical and 
political arena’.30 A subaltern social group, writes Gramsci, is ‘deprived of historical 
initiative’,31 ‘has not yet gained consciousness of its strength, its possibilities, of how it is to 
develop, and . . . therefore does not know how to escape’.32 Subaltern history is written in 
‘fragments’ and ‘episodes’. As Gramsci writes, ‘it never occurs to them [subalterns] that their 
history might have some possible importance, that there might be some value in leaving 
documentary evidence of it’.33 
Subaltern Studies, which has developed into a significant sub-field in its own right since 
its launch by historians of South Asia in 1978, has done a great deal to establish the diversity, 
complexity, and historicity of subaltern social groups in the history of South Asia and beyond.34 
Subaltern optics have been brought to bear, to some extent, in Middle East Studies. Stephanie 
Cronin captures the main point by defining subaltern social groups in the region as ‘a wide 
range of groups who possess a subordinate social, political, economic and ideological status’.35 
Relevant here are the urban and rural poor, workers, the peasantry, slum dwellers, the 
unemployed, as well as women, migrants, bandits, gypsies, and slaves. In other research, 
women dispersed in patrilineal households ‘bargaining with patriarchy’,36 facing state violence 
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in Egypt after 2011,37 selling sex in colonial Cairo,38 or LGBTQ groups in Israel/Palestine,39 
and workers of many kinds (industrial, peasant, migrant, precarious, domestic, female, 
marginalized, self-exploiting, squeezed, and survivalist)40 have been studied via an interpretive 
understanding of subaltern situations and experiences. Bayat writes strikingly of subaltern 
groups in Egypt as those feared as ‘the spoilers of public order, as culprits of violence’.41 As 
the Tunisian, Jewish anti-colonial intellectual, Albert Memmi put it in the 1950s, the 
‘colonised’ are those who are immediately punished even if so much as a ‘rusty weapon’ is 
discovered among them.42  
Edward Said, drawing on Gramsci, Foucault, and a broad democratic humanism, 
understood the situations of Muslims, Arabs and Palestinians, in the diaspora and the region, 
in terms of how such groups were Otherized and subordinated by the cultural hegemony of 
Orientalism combined with imperial domination.43 Massad has extended such optics, drawing 
on Gramsci, but especially Foucault, in thinking about the making of Jordanian national 
identity as an effect of a colonial discourse,44 and in studying how males in the Arab world 
engaged in same-sex practices have been subjected to the missionary activities of a ‘gay 
international’ rooted in Euro-American identitarian constructions of sexuality.45 Frantz Fanon, 
the psychiatrist from Martinique, anti-colonial activist, and organic intellectual of Third World 
and black liberation, explains how the racializing look from the site of the white other on the 
black epidermis fixed and ‘sealed’ what would otherwise be a rich dialectic between body and 
world ‘into . . . crushing objecthood’.46 Many colonized Tunisians, in the same period, sought 
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to assimilate to French ‘civilization’, a concept elaborated and disseminated in civil society by 
dominant and intermediary groups, via an assimilation process that was torturous, impossible 
and alienating.47 Decades earlier we find critics of imperialism such as the Egyptian Abdallah 
Al-Nadim (1843-1896) lamenting the way in which ‘Orientals’ have been made into a ‘race . . 
. created to serve the Europeans’, ‘reduced to mere employees, planting, harvesting, and 
manufacturing in order that Europe’s . . . fortune increase and the power of her royal houses be 
swelled’.48 
Cronin makes the vital point that subaltern groups are usually erased from history-
writing and considered of no account. As Memmi notes: ‘[t]he most serious blow suffered by 
the colonized is being removed from history and from the community. Colonization usurps any 
free role in either war or peace, every decision contributing to his [or her] destiny and that of 
the world, and all cultural and social responsibility’ [emphasis added]’.49 The colonized, writes 
Memmi, is out of the game: ‘He [or she] is no way a subject of history any more. Of course, 
[she, or] he carries its burden, often more cruelly than others, but always as an object’.50 As 
Gilsenan’s rich ethnography in ‘the periphery of the periphery’ in North Lebanon shows, male 
fellahin (peasant) households thought his questions about their genealogy and family history 
ridiculous, and directed him towards the socially honourable, those worthy of history, the 
landowners and ‘lords’ of the region.51  
The study of hegemonic discourse itself, however, can draw research far from an 
interpretive understanding of subaltern struggles. A Gramscian perspective insists that we 
refuse to succumb to the top-down spectralization of the subaltern, and to any potentially 
abstract and ahistorical reading of ‘the subaltern cannot speak’;52 a Gramscian optic enjoins us 
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to seize instead upon every trace of subaltern initiative, and to read ‘against the grain’. This 
was certainly the life-long project of the foremost Ottoman labour historian, Donald Quataert, 
who always insisted that sources existed for those prepared to search. As Gramsci writes, some 
part of the subaltern group is always ‘directive and responsible’53 and hegemony is never fully 
complete or seamless. We are rightly enjoined not to romanticize resistance: we should equally 
refuse to romanticize power. 
In short, Gramscian optics make the interpretive understanding of subaltern social 
groups and situations fundamental. Such an optic takes us to the heart of understanding how 
hegemony is variably and historically formulated, how it works, and where its limits are. Even 
more importantly, this focus is fundamental to grasping the quality, extent and limits of 
transformative activity itself, given that such activity works changes on subaltern situations 
and conditions, and this is ultimately the meaning and measure of transformation. The most 
important critiques, for instance, of Tunisian liberal democracy after 2011, turn on whether it 
has transformed certain subaltern conditions – in regards to the socioeconomic dispossession 
of the inhabitants of peripheral regions and the lives of gendered and sexualized minorities.54 
The first moment in a Gramscian popular politics, then, involves a historicized understanding 
of subaltern situations and conditions.  
Contradictory Consciousness  
 
 
The second moment in a Gramscian perspective on popular politics is subaltern sites of 
contradictory consciousness. This problematic points towards hegemonic incompleteness. 
Contradictory consciousness has a crucial value as a genuine expression, however fleeting and 
dimly registered, of contradictions in existing forms of hegemony. It is consciousness torn by 
the gap between how things and persons are supposed to be in practice and in theory according 
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to the dominant hegemony, and how things and persons are experienced in practice and in 
theory by subaltern social groups. Contradictory consciousness is the contradictory 
coincidence of two kinds of consciousness in one consciousness. On the one side is a 
consciousness ‘logically affirmed as an intellectual choice’,55 or ‘uncritically absorbed’,56 a 
form of consciousness either voluntaristic or doxic, associated with and intertwined with 
hegemony, dominant worldviews, civil society, capitalism and the state, a consciousness 
present and structuring as common sense in the life-activity of subaltern social groups; and on 
the other side is a consciousness which is present, implicit, and intertwined with the life-
activity, practices (economic, embodied, social, cultural, or political) and experiences of 
subaltern social groups, a consciousness ‘which emerges from the real activity of each man [or 
woman], which is implicit in his [or her] mode of action’.57 When contradictory consciousness 
occurs in the lives of great masses, writes Gramsci, it is not a matter of ‘self-deception’, bad 
faith or hypocrisy, but ‘the expression of profounder contrasts of a social historical order’.58 
Contradictory consciousness is a double consciousness existing in and rending apart a 
single subaltern consciousness. It is half-articulate in that it does not in and of itself have a 
language or a conception of the world, and certainly not a developed politics. It can often be 
expressed in mixtures of parody, satire, nostalgia, irony, rejection, dissent, and desire of widely 
varying political significance.59 It is not false (as in Vanguardist conceptions), angry (as in 
Orientalism), or irrational and/or mired in custom and tradition (as in rationalist Jacobinism) 
but linked to the contradictory structure of life activity and common sense in a given hegemony: 
it is only incoherent and unsystematic in so far as it expresses the contradictions of social and 
historical order. In other words, its very incoherence is revealing and vital, rather than simply 
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wrong or obfuscatory. Contradictory consciousness is not what Gilles Deleuze rightly 
dismisses as a ‘little, private affair’, an individual psychological trauma or deviation requiring 
expert therapy, but a vital dissonance to be elucidated. It is a collective form of un-rest that 
calls for, and indeed searches out, the act of ‘only connect’, of articulation.  
Contradictory consciousness is bound with up hegemonic contradictions and 
‘profound’ historical contrasts. Gramsci notes, against the insistence of the ruling class, the 
lack of complete coherence even in ruling conceptions.60 The state can also run into a far 
reaching ‘crisis of authority’ (i.e. of hegemony), brought about in part by the failings of ruling 
groups in major undertakings, for which they had previously won or forcibly extracted, mass 
consent. Here previous patterns of subaltern consent and subjectivation are thrown into 
disarray. Common sense, furthermore, is not a seamless, singular expression of the dominant 
worldview: it is ‘necessarily fragmentary’,61 has different vernaculars, regional particulars, 
social layers, different tendencies, ambiguities, contradictions, and forms of relative autonomy. 
At the level of capitalism and class, consciousness among factory wage-workers, for instance, 
of their activity as the production of use-value sustaining and expanding life could be doubled 
in contradictory fashion with a wage-worker consciousness conceiving their activity as labour 
power for sale making commodities for the expansion and accumulation of capital.  
Gramsci writes highly suggestively of the ‘infinity of traces’, historical and social 
deposits left in bodies and culture left over from previous but now defunct forms of hegemony. 
Such traces could give rise to and form part of contradictory consciousness, part and parcel, 
for example, of an ‘intellectual crisis, wavering between the old and the new, when he [or she] 
has lost faith in the old, and has not yet come down in favour of the new’.62 It is also useful to 
consider how concrete, subordinated individuals are torn between impulses to non-being and 
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being, to assimilation and to confrontation, between despair and what Robin Kelley calls 
freedom dreams. 
Contradictory consciousness has been under-researched in Middle East Studies. 
Michael Gilsenan’s ethnography, however, a study of violence, narrative and social change 
among lords, middling strata and peasants in north Lebanon in the decades before the start of 
the civil war (1975), elaborates on a more or less identical phenomenon in great detail, 
especially in the final two chapters of his study ‘the challenge of work and wages’ and 
‘horsemen on tractors’. Changes in land tenure, growing investment by ‘lordly’ landowners in 
the cities, the spread of wage-labour, changing manners and social comportment among 
landowners and middling strata, new forms of middle class education, and new consumption 
patterns among the fellahin (peasant households), new meanings of tradition and modernity, 
and above all the ‘imperatives of work’ for the poor and the decline of life structured according 
to social honour, generated huge contradictions in the consciousness of those who felt bound 
to masculine honour narratives in one sense, but who were also aware that dominant practices 
no longer conformed to such codes, and wage-labour and the market was increasingly a basic 
imperative in their own life activities. Gilsenan writes that in such a context, ‘[t]he gap between 
act and narrative, social reality and agent’s consciousness . . . [is] no longer a matter of 
individual failure to establish congruence between seeming and being, it . . . [is] a collective 
experience’.63 A more exact definition of contradictory consciousness could hardly be found. 
Moreover, the expression of such consciousness, as elsewhere, often involved irony, parody, 
satire, and unlikely dreams,64 figures which do not conceal the seriousness and urgency of 
subaltern experiences of social suffering, dishonour, violence and impoverishment.65 
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Perhaps we can, further, read the ‘infinity of traces’ in the recent protests of male and 
female slum-dwellers in Morocco, dispossessed by urban ‘development’ schemes, but who 
underline their descent from the Guich tribe, and their proud, nineteenth century association 
with the royal authority of the makhzan.66 Edward Said, of course, made the ‘infinity of traces’ 
central to his excavation of what it meant to be an ‘Oriental’ growing up amid British education 
systems in Egypt and then working in diasporic exile as an Arab Palestinian in the United 
States.67 Such traces could be detected in Palestinian ‘memories of revolt’,68 or in the traditions 
that informed the consciousness of the Iranian rural poor, and the uses they made of 
‘mythologized’ pasts.69 It seems, furthermore, that subaltern consciousness can be made 
double, by knowledge of the siren song of a Utopian alternative. Few subaltern social groups 
in MENA history have been completely unaware of religious or lay intellectuals who proclaim 
from the margins, such as Ali Shari‘ati in 1970s Iran, that things might be otherwise. There are 
also coeval movements and events elsewhere which suggest alternatives to the status quo, such 
as how Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 were seen in Syria in 2011, or how the Greek war of 
independence was perceived by Christians on Mt Lebanon in the 1820s and 1830s,70 or how a 
launderer’s son from Asyut in the 1940s conceived of the ‘workers and peasants revolution’ in 
the Soviet Union.71  
The study of everyday forms of resistance can also shed light on ways in which 
contradictory consciousness develops among subaltern social groups. In Syria in the 2000s, 
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‘acting as-if’ worked to preserve an outward surface of consent via ‘wooden conformity’ in 
Asad’s Syria,72 and worked to pulverize subjects, who lost their sense of dignity by being 
forced to say what they did not believe; but also in this conception there are multiple layers of 
irony, the belief that things could be otherwise, dreams which should not be spoken, but 
sometimes were. In other cases, the informal economy channels resources and offers 
protections to the urban poor according to locally-determined rules, networks and norms, 
undermining ‘what Gramsci called the ideological hegemony of the state’,73 by creating a gap 
between the informal and the formal, between state rules and local rules, thus provoking a sense 
of contradiction.  
Finally, one can argue that globalization, diaspora, exile politics, migration, refugee 
flows, travel, and obligatory cultural and linguistic translation can generate a kind of 
contradictory consciousness – a sense of not being at home when at home, or of being Kharij 
Al-Makan or ‘Out of Place’, as in the title of Edward Said’s autobiography; or a sense of 
‘dislocation, dismemberment, and exile’74 as experienced by Syrian labour migrants to 
Lebanon, who became ‘betwixt and between, a stranger, in different ways, to both worlds’.75 
In migrant subjects, travel and translation, one find a certain dismemberment of identity 
schemas, i.e. a contradictory consciousness of ‘travel’ as both discovering, learning, and 
bettering on the one hand, and, on the other, as a loss of organic roots, of authenticity, of links 
to kith and kin, of frameworks of linguistic and cultural comprehensibility. One might invoke, 
for instance, the almost robotic isolation and sense of disconnection that Ahdaf Soueif depicts 
in her main protagonist in the Eye of the Sun when she returns to Egypt from her spell in ‘the 
North’. At stake – at another level – could be the sort of ‘self-doubt’ that Olivier Roy associates 
 
72 Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination. 
73 Singerman, Avenues of Participation, 271. 
74 Chalcraft, Invisible Cage, 220. 
75 Ibid., 216. 
16 
 
with rootless, de-territorialized, minority Muslims, denuded of stable cultural references.76 This 
sort of contradictory consciousness, whether resolved in rigid Manicheanism, what Dallal in 
his discussion of Wahhabism strikingly calls a ‘grim and narrow theory of unbelief’,77 or 
resolved in the dynamic, transnational embrace of polycentric routes (not roots), of hybridity, 
syncretism, translation and transculturation,78 would presumably be a powerful and ramifying 
feature of the contemporary world. 
Contradictory consciousness is Janus-faced. It is in one sense an important feature of 
subalternity, and as such as a source of weakness. Abdallah Al-Nadim lamented how we 
‘Orientals’ are ‘riven with contradictions and capitulations, constantly turning to foreigners for 
aid’.79 He wrote that ‘the folly of the Orientals has made them like the logs devoured in a fire 
so that others may forge metal’. He was searching for a single voice, mutual support, and the 
arousal of ‘slumbering energies’ in economic, political and social action.80 Rancour and 
withdrawal can be also associated with contradictory consciousness.81 Satire can be a mere 
safety valve, and everyday resistance but necessity and survivalism.82 On the other hand, 
contradictory consciousness is a moment of incompleteness in the existing hegemony, it signals 
‘a site of disarticulation’83 and provokes a practical-critical search for precisely what Al-Nadim 
sought – in the first instance – a new voice, a new language, a new conception of the world.  
Conceptions of the World 
 
The third key moment in a Gramscian popular politics arguably involves the 
development of new conceptions of the world, and their articulation, diffusion, and 
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appropriation among subaltern social groups. Here there is a passage from the half-articulate 
to the articulate; from barely comprehensible murmurings of dissent, to a communicable and 
shared language; from speechlessness to voice; and from dithering to moral ‘certitudes’.84 
There is the spread of new standards, such as a standard in which woman, for instance, is seen 
not as a doll but as ‘a human . . . in herself, with her own awareness, her own inner needs, a 
human personality entirely her own, and the dignity of an independent being’.85 There is a shift 
from heterogeneity to some form of unity; from fragmentation and division to new forms of 
personality, collective soul, and collective identity. Articulation is a key term here. It involves 
both an expression in language and conception on the one hand, and a joining of two elements 
previously sundered on the other.86 It is a cultural construction, embedded in activity, that 
overcomes contradictory consciousness through a new form of organized signification.87 
How are new conceptions elaborated? There is a compilation, out of the contradictions 
of hegemonic common sense, of an inventory of traces – an act that Gramsci calls the start 
point of critical consciousness, a start point that was precisely Edward Said’s, acting as a 
diasporic ‘Oriental’ subaltern, in his seminal critique of Western thinking about the Orient.88 
There is also ideological criticism. ‘What matters’, writes Gramsci,  
is the criticism to which such an ideological complex is subjected by the first 
representatives of the new historical phase. This criticism makes possible a process of 
differentiation and change in the relative weight that the elements of the old ideologies 
used to possess. What was previously secondary and subordinate, or even incidental, is 
now taken to be primary – becomes the nucleus of a new ideological and theoretical 
complex.89  
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Such ideological criticism does not happen ex nihilo, but draws on and re-works elements from 
existing ideologies. It involves intellectuals – specialists in mental labour. The core point here 
is that such specialists can only elaborate such conceptions successfully if they do so as organic 
intellectuals, i.e. in an organic way that it is intimately bound up with the practices, 
consciousness, conditions, and struggles of subaltern social groups. 
Studying the spread of new conceptions of the world implies a significant engagement 
with popular culture, which in turn implies the question of how meanings are re-articulated, 
organized, and circulated in the ‘fortresses’ and ‘earthworks’ of civil society – schools, media, 
cultural institutions, theatre, film, art, music, religious organizations, political parties and so 
on. At stake is the entirety of ‘cultural direction’ in a given hegemony. A whole field of 
‘cultural studies’ is opened up, with the distinctive line of sight in which culture is neither ‘the 
best of what has been thought and said’, nor an abstracted, Geertzian tissue of meaning, but 
involves conceptions of the world imbricated in practices of domination and transformation. 
Gramscian perspectives have informed research in Middle East Studies on popular 
culture and cultural politics since the 1990s.90 The inextricable involvement of conceptions of 
the world with revolutionary politics and popular protest has been underlined. Transnational, 
Leftist and Third Worldist ‘mobilising discourse’ has been shown to be fundamental to the 
politics of Palestinian armed struggle. 91 Revolutionary vision – or the lack of it – arguably 
played a key role in 2011.92 Kurdish post-nationalism has been understood in terms of 
discursive re-articulation.93 Islamism has been read in terms of the development of an 
alternative form of hegemony.94 Yaseen Noorani has done more than anyone to explore the 
fundamental cultural conditions and grammars of what makes the ‘legitimizing ideals’ of 
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cultural hegemony – nationalist or Islamist – possible in the colonial and modern Middle East.95 
The place of religion in the public sphere has been studied through Gramscian optics.96 And 
important questions about transnational cultural politics, including the border-crossing politics 
of rap, have been explored in regards to Palestine’s Jil Oslo97 and to Tunisia’s 2011 uprising.98 
One dramatic example of the intersection of activism and new conceptions of the world 
involves the re-making of what it meant to be a Muslim among Shi‘a in Iran in the 1970s. The 
revolutionary conception, as especially elaborated by the activist thinker Ali Shari‘ati, and 
appropriated among broad popular sectors, that to be a Muslim meant to be engaged in a 
revolutionary struggle for a classless society (tawhid) against injustice and tyranny, foreign and 
domestic, in the present, and the accompanying transformation of ‘Ashura rituals in civil 
society from quietist mourning ceremonies, into expressions of a revolutionary political and 
religious struggle, informed and shaped the Iranian revolution.99 Here a new conception of the 
world provided a powerful resolution to forms of contradictory consciousness – around cultural 
identity, relations to the ‘West’, authoritarianism, economy and gender. Ali Shari‘ati’s 
proposed ‘return to self’ is powerfully redolent of the ‘inventory of traces’, involving as it does, 
in his own words, not a return to a ‘mythologized’ or  ‘reactionary past’, but a ‘return to that 
particular human self which has been formed throughout history . . . . [A]n old person who 
embodies and personifies those millions of human beings who have lived in many centuries 
and have experienced changes, revolutions, various cultures, and ideologies. At the present we 
are that person’.100 
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Gramscian perspectives open up a rich critique of culture, cultural politics, and 
conceptions of the world. An illustration comes from Egypt in the 2000s. Nicola Pratt, drawing 
on Gramsci, has shown how a popular cultural hegemony – in which national authenticity, 
heteronormative masculinism, and state sovereignty form the nucleus – worked to shut down 
queer spaces, disable human rights activism in defence of bodily autonomy, and stifle 
democratic spaces of pluralism and diversity.101 This optic poses vividly the question of 
critique – on the one hand the question of the meaning and valence of the once anti-colonial 
but now suppressive conception of national authenticity, and on the other, more sotto voce in 
this particular intervention, the question of the meaning and potency of human rights practices 
and conceptions in failing to bring about transformation in regard to the overwhelming 
stigmatization of queer men. Both questions are urgent in a contemporary moment stuck 
between liberal global civil society and human rights on the one hand, itself shaped by the 
narrow, local knowledge-denying ways in ‘which various donors conceive of civil society’,102 
and newly fortified and exclusionary right-wing visions of national, religious, and cultural 
authenticity on the other. A Gramscian perspective indeed, can add a vital dimension to 
Perugini and Gordon’s important critique of human rights.103 In Gramscian optics, the cultural 
absence of the subaltern social groups, contradictory consciousness and organic intellectuals 
from the elaboration of the content of human rights codes, international law, and UN 
Conventions is a crucial dimension of the weakness of human rights activism.  
Collective Will 
 
Out of new conceptions of the world, and a new ‘culture in common’, comes not just a 
new identity, but a collective will. As Gramsci writes in a famous passage, ‘a multiplicity of 
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dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis 
of an equal and common conception of the world [emphasis added]’.104 Collective will 
presupposes and is built on conceptions held in common. Articulation, writes Stuart Hall, 
fashions a new collective will.105 Here the transition to transformative politics, and the overlap 
between culture and politics, is ever more evident. Subaltern social groups, in a process of 
transformation, discover not just who they are, where they come from, and what they believe, 
but what they want. In regards to factory workers, an individual, economic-corporate search 
for better pay and conditions is merged via culture, ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ with the ethico-
political.106 The collective will is vital as the moment in which subordinated, objectified, 
instrumentalized or subjectivized social groups start to have, and to be capable of having (on 
the basis of historically particular and organically-formulated conceptions of the world) ends 
and purposes that are their own. The fourth key moment, then, has to do with the emergence 
and workings of the collective will. 
Gramsci’s passages on the factory occupations of August-September 1920, which he 
found enduringly inspiring, are highly suggestive. He wrote that (as a result of the dereliction 
of the Italian Socialist Party), the workers ‘can rely on no one but themselves. They must, 
therefore, develop their spirit of initiative: from a disciplined, industrial object they are 
becoming a responsible subject. They have to create for themselves a collective personality, a 
collective soul, a collective will [emphasis in original]’.107 Gramsci writes of a ‘process of inner 
liberation through which the worker is transformed from executor to initiator, from mass to 
leader and guide, from brawn to brain and purpose [emphasis in original]’.108 He goes on: ‘the 
worker . . . [amid party activity] “discovers” and “invents” original ways of living, collaborates 
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“consciously” in the world’s activity, thinks, foresees, becomes responsible, becomes an 
organizer rather than someone who is organized and feels he forms a vanguard that pushes 
ahead and draws the mass of the people after it’.109 The Turin movement, Gramsci wrote, years 
later, ‘gave the masses a “theoretical” consciousness of being creators of historical and 
institutional values [emphasis in the original]’.110  
The emergence of the collective will, then, is key moment in the shift from a subaltern 
status of not being ‘an historical person, a protagonist’ to ‘being ‘responsible because it [the 
changed subaltern element] is no longer [only] resisting but an agent, necessarily active and 
taking the initiative’.111 In collective will a subject, a will immediate to itself and acting for 
itself, is forged.112 The collective will unites a collectively articulated desire for change of a 
certain kind, with some kind of effective protagonism on the ground. The collective will 
involves an ‘operative awareness of historical necessity’ and a ‘protagonist of a real and 
effective historical drama’.113 Collective will is ‘historically necessary’ not because of the 
ripeness of conditions, nor because of a guarantee of success, but because contradictory 
historical contrasts are irresolvable without it. Inherent in this concept, wherein failure is a 
possibility, is a drama, with its attendant forms of myth, poetry, art, and passion. 
Research in Middle East Studies has referenced the concept of collective will both 
directly and indirectly. One of the most dramatic recent examples of collective will in the 
MENA being that expressed and enacted during the uprisings of 2011: ‘the people demand to 
overthrow the regime’. In Egypt this collective will can be read as directly and inextricably 
linked to the widespread development, above all since September 2000, of broadly 
disseminated conceptions in which the regime was figured as the key source of oppression. 
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Conversely, the lack of demands to end domestic violence in contemporary Egypt, for instance, 
can be understood in terms of broadly held conceptions of the world in which women are 
blamed and men excused for masculine domestic violence. Men are not blamed, not because 
women are congenitally or psychologically timid, or solely because they are beaten into 
submission, or because domestic violence is a figment of the Islamophobic imagination, but 
because many women, researchers have found, do not want to blame them.114  
As elsewhere, the Gramscian perspective opens many avenues for critique. Egypt’s 
labour movement arguably failed in recent times to move beyond economic corporate demands, 
and thus was unable to join hands with other segments whose demands were ethico-political.115 
Conversely, it could well be argued that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt did not move beyond 
its moralizing, ethico-political demands, and thus failed to make links with constituencies 
seeking socioeconomic change. Or, middle class nationalists in Egypt romanticized the 
subaltern peasantry as a repository of authenticity,116 thus enshrining them within an 
essentialist framework which did not expect them to transform themselves. Other projects of 
middle class moral, ascetic, or therapeutic ‘uplift’, such as bourgeois nationalist abolitionism 
in regard to sex work,117 or middle class youth psychology,118 invert this pattern by seeking to 
change only the subaltern through the good graces of social superiors without seeing any value 
in popular self-activity. 
Organization 
 
The fifth moment involves questions of organization. In Gramsci, in general, 
consciousness and action march together in a complex, differentiated, dialectical unity. The 
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two ‘phases’ of ‘science and action . . . are homogeneous and heterogeneous at the same 
time’.119 The status of thought and action in historical protagonism is equal. As  Gramsci 
continues: ‘Christ – Weltanschauung, and St. Paul – organiser, action, expansion of the 
Weltanschauung – are both necessary to the same degree and therefore of the same historical 
stature’.120 In the same passage Gramsci repeats this idea regarding Marx and Lenin, asserting 
that it is ‘stupid and useless’ to create a hierarchy between them. Gramsci also writes that those 
who will the ends must will the means,121 which can only include organization, which Gramsci 
regards as indispensable to distinguish and establish the independence of the subaltern social 
group, and to express, make concrete in practice, and diffuse the collective will.122 The party, 
Gramsci writes, is the ‘historical laboratory’ of new forms of consciousness: it works out ‘the 
ethics and the politics corresponding to these conceptions’ [i.e. new conceptions produced by 
intellectuals] and act[s] as it were as their historical ‘laboratory’.’123 Organization is a unifier 
of theory and practice, and a site of learning: a place where the educator can be educated, and 
a place where new ethics and social and economic relations can be directly enacted, as in, for 
instance, the Factory Councils of Turin in 1918-20. Organized collectivity also, through 
principles of delegation, representation and informed debate, determines the line of collective 
action to be followed, and engages as a new element on the terrain of civil society.  
Gramsci’s preferred mode of organization seems to have been a form of ‘democratic 
centralism’. This he saw as the only form in which the critical, political and historical dialectic 
could function, the essential point of which he expressed in a luminous phrase: the ‘critical 
search for what is equal in the apparent diversity, and distinct and even opposite in the apparent 
uniformity’.124 Democratic centralism encourages in practice autonomy, participation and 
 
119 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 382. 
120 Idem. 
121 Gramsci, Political Writings (1910-1920), 68. 
122 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 334. 
123 Ibid., p. 335. 
124 Gramsci cited in Finocchiaro, Gramsci and dialectical thought, 237. 
25 
 
initiative, implying ‘an agile and flexible articulation, that would allow the proletarian body to 
continue to live whatever blows might be inflicted upon it as a whole or on its individual 
members’.125 Rules of organizing should not be perpetual but ‘realistic and always keeps close 
to concrete life in perpetual development’, reviewing and criticizing past activity and putting 
out explanatory circulars.126 Gramsci carried on a sharp critique of organizations that became 
co-opted and/or bureaucratized, acting as ends in themselves, as ‘bankers of men in a monopoly 
situation’ like the Turin trade unions,127 or degenerating into an anarchist and individualist free-
for-all, lapsing into spontaneism, ‘discontinuity’ and ‘improvisation’,128 or losing contact with 
subaltern social groups by getting ‘lost in “private feuds”’,129 or imposing a rigid revolutionary 
theory on members, or promoting a sole leader. Gramsci envisaged proletarian organization to 
include political parties, clandestine groups, factory councils, congresses, peasant leagues, 
newspapers and the media, schools for popular pedagogy and literacy, and cultural institutes.  
In Middle East Studies, Gramscian optics on organization have played an important 
role in delivering a critique of national and international NGOs.130 Gramscian perspectives 
have also informed critiques of revolutionary activism in 2011, the lack of platforms, and the 
problems with the organizing style of horizontalism, which makes rapid decision-making 
difficult, can de-moralize participants by tedious proceduralism, is relatively easy to disrupt or 
hijack, and can suffer from hidden hierarchies.131 A Gramscian critique points away from any 
panacea in everyday modes of resistance by insisting on organization. Bayat has pointed to the 
lack of organizing in 2011 by activists among mass constituencies.132 On the other hand, 
Gramscian optics can deliver a strong critique of top-down, middle-class, and vanguardist 
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approaches to organization, as Boeddeling’s research on the importance of subaltern praxis in 
the making of the 2011 Tunisian uprising heavily underscores.133 
Strategy 
 
The sixth moment in a Gramscian popular politics engages questions of strategy, the 
development of a line of collective action by organized groups. While organization works 
changes directly on bodies and material relations, it also is the vehicle determining strategies 
and tactics for fighting on the terrain of civil society and the state. In regard to the first, Gramsci 
famously envisaged a long ‘war of position’, capturing positions in civil society, re-organizing 
relations of association, and remaking worldviews. In regard to the second, he envisaged a ‘war 
of manoeuvre’, a more rapid, decisive and outright confrontation remaking and transforming 
political society and the state.134 The latter, Gramsci indicated, could be prepared by an 
‘underground war’ of clandestine armed preparation. The war of position serves as ‘mental 
preparation’ before and in the service of the war of manoeuvre; it also matters after the seizure 
of state power to avoid counter-revolution and civil war.  
These concepts have been usefully put to work in regards to the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt. Founded in Egypt in 1928 in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate, the 
Brotherhood sought to make Egypt more properly Muslim and ultimately to bring about an 
Islamic state. As Kandil has argued, on release from prison under Sadat in the 1970s, down to 
the 2000s, the Muslim Brotherhood undertook a long war of position. While cultural da‘wa 
involved a proselytizing summons to the ‘true Islam’, the Brotherhood commenced a long 
struggle in civil society, among students, in the professional syndicates, in the media, in 
mosques, businesses, and charitable associations. The Brotherhood engaged with ‘political 
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society’ through the judiciary, the religious establishment, and running in parties and elections 
from the 1980s onwards. Militant splinter groups, impatient with this gradualism, developed 
their own ‘war of manoeuvre’, confronting the ‘near enemy’ (the state) with armed attacks, 
especially in the 1990s. Kandil argues that the lack of a developed ‘war of manoeuvre’ among 
the Muslim Brotherhood itself left it without a strategy to confront state power, leaving it 
vulnerable to repression, which Kandil sees as an inevitable response by the authorities to a 
successful war of position.135 Kandil’s study is an important illustration of how Gramscian 
strategic analytics can be brought to bear on Islamist politics. It raises anew – in a different 
context to the post-1945 Italy of Palmiro Togliatti – the question of whether or not the war of 
position tends to shift towards reformism.  
Historical Bloc 
 
The final moment in a Gramscian optic on popular politics engages the question of 
‘historical bloc’. Gramsci conceives of revolutionary change less in terms of a Leninist single 
party seizing state power, and more in terms of a rising, alternative bloc of forces in alliance, 
such as new forms of economic organization (e.g. the Factory Councils), newspapers (such as 
L’Ordine Nuovo), cultural associations, a revolutionary political party, and armed groups, 
forces capable of forming a revolutionary bloc,136 stitching together base and superstructure in 
new ways, realizing a new, differentiated unity of theory and practice, and underpinning the 
realization of an alternative hegemony.137 Gramsci did not just blame bourgeois hegemony for 
the failure of the revolution in Italy: he also criticized the narrowness of the communist 
historical bloc.138  
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The concept of historical bloc can help understand revolutionary change, its limits or 
failure in the MENA region. It has been argued, for instance, that migrant labour protests on 
the Arabian peninsula in the 1950s and 1960s, in contrast to those since the later 1970s, posed 
a meaningful threat to monarchies because of their articulation within a larger, diverse 
historical bloc, stitched together by radical Arab nationalism.139 Likewise, the ‘Great revolt’ of 
1936-39 drew its historical capacity, arguably, not from a sole leadership, but from a 
‘generative alignment’ of diverse forces, a ‘radicalized, rebellious and multitudinous 
formation’.140 Conversely, the fragility of the Egyptian revolutionary uprising, D’Aria argues, 
owed much to the inconsistency of the ‘intermediary force’, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
oscillating between support for the military on the one hand, and alliance with the subaltern, 
revolutionary  ‘bloc’  on the other.141 
Discussion 
 
The framework presented above aims to grasp popular politics as a transformative 
activity, as theory and practice, being and consciousness in becoming, and as changing vastly 
along the way. The subject of study – conscious activity challenging domination and bringing 
about post-subaltern social relations – is not static by definition. The framework ranges from 
the study of subaltern social groups ‘trembling in hundreds before a single white man’, to the 
study of those ‘able to organize themselves and defeat the most powerful European nations of 
their day’.142 The seven moments outlined above aim to capture within a single framework the 
diachronic and synchronic diversity inherent in such historical protagonism, allowing for a 
depth of analytic purchase on distinct moments.  
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Each moment, or ‘turning force’, in the series of seven presupposes and builds on the 
prior moment(s). Organization, for instance, cannot exist meaningfully without the collective 
will that it expresses, nor collective will without a conception of the world. Transformative 
activity deepens without guarantees, however. Much depends on historical protagonism itself. 
Lines of causation can also run ‘backwards’ through the series. Conceptions of the world, for 
instance, are educated and expanded by organizational and strategic activity. Popular politics 
here is slow-moving, and multi-dimensional, a ‘long labour’, with many set-backs, and 
incremental gains. Such a conception, does not of course preclude the lighting strike, the war 
of manoeuvre, the moment after many defeats and much preparation, it is declared ‘Hic 
Rhodus, hic salta! Here is the rose, here dance!’143  
The perspective is not a species of populism, in which a unified and authentic people is 
betrayed by rulers personified as conspiring or alien elites. Nowhere has any pure category of 
‘the people’ been invoked. Nor, conversely, do these optics posit the reform only of a 
corrupted/backward subaltern. At stake instead is what Marx embraced as revolutionary 
practice: the ‘coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-
changing’.144 At stake, is the transformation of subaltern social groups and the terms of the 
existing hegemony. A Gramscian framework enables us to see, write about and engage in ‘the 
genuine mobilization of popular demands and discontents’,145 what Gramsci called ‘mass 
politics and not merely an adventure by groups claiming to represent the masses’.146 
Conclusion 
 
This article has offered the outlines of a Gramscian theoretical framework for studying 
popular politics in the Middle East and North Africa. The point is to enable researchers to see 
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and research transformative activity, to carry on a critique of popular mobilization, and to 
inform transformation in the present. The article has put forward a concept of popular politics 
as a slow-moving, complex and many-layered transformative activity, a form of historical 
protagonism, capable of challenging subordination, working changes on existing forms of 
hegemony and founding new, post-subaltern social relations. Rooting the framework in 
Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis, the article distinguishes seven, inter-related moments in 
popular politics: subaltern social groups, contradictory consciousness, conceptions of the 
world, collective will, organization, strategy and historical bloc. I aim to have illustrated how 
these concepts can work in Middle East Studies.  
The core purpose is to contribute to a Gramscian alternative to dominant approaches, 
rooted ultimately in either social movement studies, in which challenges to subordination go 
missing, in materialist Marxism, which continues to be dogged by economism, or in cultural 
studies, which is problematic for its sometime cultural abstraction. An important aim, further, 
is to elaborate a Gramscian perspective on popular movements useful for historians, political 
scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists, at a time when Gramscian optics are more largely 
developed in political theory, literary criticism and international relations. It also aims at an 
optic capable of recovering subaltern activism, against the conventional centrality of top-down 
understandings of hegemony. While drawing much from Subaltern Studies, this article, by 
returning to Gramsci’s work, aims to bring into focus moments of transformative activity that 
extend far beyond, and strike against, the confines of subordination, exclusion, and 
speechlessness that conventionally frame the limits of Subaltern Studies itself. The article also 
aims to think popular politics in a way distinct from conservative scorn, liberal discomfort, Left 
sectarianism, and right-wing populism, at a moment of danger in the present. Overall, it is 
hoped that this article will stimulate debate and inspire new and critical research oriented to 
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